Can other agents read your agent card?
An agent introduces itself with a card published at /.well-known/agent-card.json. It is the only document another agent reads before deciding to call you. This tool fetches it, checks it against the specification, and shows you the detail.
Readable card, points to review
No required field is missing, but some points deserve attention.
What the card declares
- Name
- Access0x1 Payment Agent
- Provider
- Access0x1
- Agent version
- 0.1.0
- Protocol version
- 1.0
- Transport
- JSONRPC
- Endpoint
- https://access0x1.xyz/api/agent
- Card shape
- pre-v1.0
- Location
- standard location
- Skills
- 4
- Response time
- 283 ms
Findings
- WarningCard written in the shape used before v1.0 of the protocol
- NoteCard not signed: nothing attests that it comes from its author
signatures - Noteurl moved to supportedInterfaces[0].url in v1.0
url - NoteprotocolVersion moved to supportedInterfaces[].protocolVersion in v1.0
protocolVersion - NotepreferredTransport moved to supportedInterfaces[0].protocolBinding in v1.0
preferredTransport - NotesupportsAuthenticatedExtendedCard moved to capabilities.extendedAgentCard in v1.0
supportsAuthenticatedExtendedCard
Declared skills
- Pay an x402 endpointSettles a single x402 / EIP-3009 micro-payment for a priced endpoint, within the agent's budget mandate. Enforced by the on-chain SessionGrant ceiling and the in-process daily meter (CEI: check budget, then pay; refund on unresolved 402).
- Bounded pay-per-call loopFires a bounded series of x402 micro-payments (capped per request) for autonomous consumption of a metered API, never exceeding the SessionGrant budget.
- Derive AP2 mandate chainExpresses the agent's on-chain SessionGrant authorization as an AP2 Intent Mandate (W3C Verifiable Credential), and builds the hash-chained Cart and Payment mandates, so an AP2-aware counterparty can verify the agent acted within a user-authorized, bounded, revocable mandate. Pure derivation — moves no money.
- Map an ERC-7715 spend permissionMaps an ERC-7715 wallet_requestExecutionPermissions grant onto SessionGrant.openSessionFor params, returns the opaque 7715 `context` (= abi.encode(address sessionGrant, bytes32 sessionId)), and builds the ERC-7710 redeemDelegations descriptor that points at SessionGrant.spend. Pure off-chain derivation — moves no money; the on-chain 7710 router facade is deferred post-event. Lets a 7715-capable wallet grant once and a 7710-aware delegate redeem non-custodially against the existing SessionGrant.
Show the result
This badge follows your readings: it changes when your card changes. Paste it in your README.
Markdown
[](https://kopass.app/a2a/validator?url=https://access0x1.click)HTML
<a href="https://kopass.app/a2a/validator?url=https://access0x1.click"><img src="https://kopass.app/a2a/badge/aHR0cHM6Ly9hY2Nlc3MweDEuY2xpY2s.svg" alt="A2A card" height="20"></a>The rules come from the protocol's specification/a2a.proto file, where every required field is marked as such. Nothing is added.
Cards read here feed the KoPass daily reading: 229 agents followed, 224 of which answered on the last pass.